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Paradox in preventing and promoting torture: marginalising ‘harm’ for
the sake of global ordering. Reﬂections on a decade of risk/security
globalisation
Mark Findlay∗
Singapore Management University, Singapore
The ultimate result of globalisation is that as the world setting is compressed there is an
intensiﬁcation of consciousness towards global interests, such as selective ordering,
running parallel with strongly inﬂuential autonomous interests of the nation state and
regional concerns. However, as risk and security disproportionately motivate
globalisation, dominant nation state interests (which are at the heart of what
operationalises global hegemony) become the prevailing measure of global ordering.
Attitudes to ‘harm’ converge around these sectarian interests from the local to the
global. As such, the need to torture, it is logically and even ‘legally’ argued, to better
ensure domestic security will, if consistent with hegemonic interest, bring about both
domestic and global ordering as a consequence. This article argues that globalisation
has created a number of paradoxes where global ordering and governance are dictated
by the dominant political hegemony and rights become secularized, not universal.
Those who seek to contest the views of the hegemony, such as terrorists, are placed
outside the global order and international protection and thus are subjected to the
one-sided appreciation of harm that has been constructed by the hegemony1 in
attempts at global ordering.
Keywords: torture; universal rights; risk; security
Introduction
The paradox of preventing torture through international law, while at the same time
promoting it within a security/risk paradigm of world ordering, is a dangerous conse-
quence of contemporary globalisation.2 This article will examine more than the politi-
cised pretence of torture prohibition through international law, mocked as it now is
by self-defence justiﬁcations for torturing. The argument here advanced to explain the
apparent divergence between law and practice is that the prevailing governance
duality of local and global security interests which characterises globalisation in the
‘war on terror’ epoch deciphers this paradox, while failing in its reconciliation. What
remains problematic in the relationship between torture and governance is the desire
of signiﬁcant ‘rule of law’ states in the global hegemony, otherwise known to endorse
human rights rhetoric, to call on legal justiﬁcations for qualifying the jus cogens conven-
tion against torture in any circumstances.
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Much is at stake here. The last decade of risk/security globalisation3 has witnessed the
re-assertion of military power over fundamental human rights protection under the guise of
self-defence doctrines and the responsibility to protect, accompanied by a profound attack
on one of the most universally conﬁrmed human rights protections. This attack has not been
baldly asserted as might is right, but in terms of some version of constitutional legality. The
challenge is all the more insidious in that otherwise ‘rule of law’ states employ international
legality to assert the supremacy of ensuring global ordering above the inviolability of
human integrity at its most basic level. Some would even suggest that to do otherwise is
to neglect the most basic obligations of the nation state to protect its citizens. Add to this
the post 9/11 invocation of the global hegemony to ﬁght on behalf of civilization and
the heat behind the torture/not torture debate is far from surprising.
Another important consideration in this opportunity to reﬂect on a decade of risk/secur-
ity globalisation and its consequences for a rights-based global governance or some new
form of international politics,4 is the manner in which harm has been subjectiﬁed and con-
textualised both to conﬁrm and constrain a new realistic appreciation of security before
self-determination, and its coverage and meaning in the sense of negotiated harm to human-
ity in the selective manner detailed below.
Torture: human rights or risk and security?
Under international humanitarian law torture is a crime of the highest order.5 Yet recently,
and somewhat reluctantly, global alliance states have confronted revelations concerning
their use of torture as both legally permissible and morally essential. Torture has been pro-
moted in a utilitarian environment as a commensurate necessity of responsible globalised
crime control, in particular as a device to counter terrorist threat. The internationalisation
of global terror as a crime threat requiring drastic self-defence is the discourse both of glo-
balised crime and control/risk and security in this most recent and transforming era of
globalisation.6
Globalisation is ‘paradoxical in the way it uniﬁes and delineates, internationalises and
localises. . .’.7 In a similar fashion the duality of torture as a crime internationally, and as
rational crime control locally, suggests that torture (prohibited or prevented) cannot currently
be disentangled from the risk/security focus of ordering (local to global). This control/rights
tension is much more than a legal distinction or a moral contradiction. It is, I later suggest, a
natural consequence of contemporary globalisation (local to global) where risk/security
trumps rights and uniform legality.8 A governance atmosphere, placing security above
rights, is supported by a segmented disaggregation of universal rights where the protection
of the ‘legitimate’ global citizen is valorised and the ascription of anything like rights to
the terrorist or to their resistant communities is not even argued for.9
Global crime control takes on its hegemonic reality in the form of the decisions and acts
favouring only some actors (suffering harm from resistance) while marginalising cultures
and communities on the receiving end of harm for deterrence. The harm from torture
speciﬁcally is diminished in domestic governance terms when directed against terrorism
and terrorists, at least as a justiﬁed harm in the process of world ordering.
The following observation by Nowak encapsulates this sectarian argument in the wider
discriminatory and paradoxical frame of contemporary globalisation, as against the prevail-
ing governance background of national self interest:
rather than homogenising the human condition, the technological annulment of temporal/
spatial distances tends to polarize it. It emancipates certain humans from territorial constraints
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and renders certain community generating meanings extra-territorial – while denuding the ter-
ritory, to which other people go on being conﬁned, of its meaning and its identity-endowing
capacity. For some people it augurs an unprecedented freedom from physical obstacles and
unheard-of ability to move and act from a distance. For others it portends the impossibility
of appropriating and domesticating the locality from which they have little chance of cutting
themselves free in order to move elsewhere. With ‘distances no longer meaning anything’,
localities, separated by distances also lose their meanings. This however augurs freedom of
meaning-creation for some but portends ascription to meaninglessness for others.10
The globe is divided and humanity and the rights it enjoys are reserved to those for whom
securitisation poses no risk. Torture has lost its unequivocal meaning as a cruel consequence
of this selective and discriminatory disaggregation of ‘governance for all’. The monopoly of
the beneﬁts of globalisation has not only left those beyond global hegemony without access
to its protection, but worst still without legitimacy in a debate where torture is denied as
harm to those tortured in the name of securing legitimate others on whose behalf torture
is given utilitarian harm-diminishing meaning. Rights become relative and global govern-
ance is for a ﬂuid community of legitimate citizen/victims facing ‘modern life and its
fears’.11
Bauman would have it that the management of fear is a great challenge for institutions
and processes of global governance where the world is ‘out of touch together’12. Incremen-
tally, the justiﬁcation and execution of torture in a world where might is right has a long and
recurrent history. The difference in the current closing age of globalisation as security is
that through the conventions of international law, the interests of those who set the world
ordering agenda are projected and protected against a universal rights perspective,
despite the economic and political marginalisation of those on the receiving end of globa-
lisation, whose rights are conditional.13
Even in a contracting globe where pluralist, cultural, economic and religious values are
tolerated only in so far as they do not challenge the norms of a prevailing political alliance,
world order has come to rely on a risky mix of domination and violent resistance.14 In such
a disaggregated political and moral context of governance any realistic appreciation of harm
in the determination of to torture or not to torture cannot be achieved under circumstances
where only the valorised citizen/victim enjoys equality when rights are at issue.15
From a global governance perspective the risk/security paradigm itself is risky. With risk pre-
diction and security evaluation, more reliant on political and cultural context than comprehen-
sive and comparative harm measures, community safety gives way to community imperative as
a primary governance obligation. It might be said that this is not unusual for governance frame-
works which run to service political agendas. However, the difference for global governance is
its declared commitment to the safety of humanity. Further, with globalisation promoting
preferred regulatory strategies to address risk/security concerns, governance against terror
will become more polarized and essentially less tolerant of cultural diversity as it is deemed
threatening.16
Globalisation as local risk/global security
This globalisation process which points to the extension of global cultural interrelatedness can
also be understood as leading to a global ecumene, deﬁned as a region of persistent culture
interaction and exchange.17
That said, a critical concern of the analysis to follow is how the ‘ecumene’ of torture
prohibition has been qualiﬁed by strong and competing nation state and alliance interests
that place risk/security cultures against fundamental supra-national rights commitments.
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One answer to this lies in the regressive duality of globalisation itself. As duality it is illusory
and potentially distracting at this stage of the globalisation process only to concentrate on the
‘collapsing’ of time and space without recognising the diversity of human consequence which
remains. . .globalisation as a concept refers both to the compression of the world and the inten-
siﬁcation of consciousness of the world as a whole. . ..18
Within that intensiﬁcation of consciousness is a struggle over the meaning of torture which
has a potential to shake the foundations of international humanitarian legality in the same
way that the agreement on the conventions discussed in the following text opened up the
vision of a new age of human dignity for all. Hegemonic interests that would determine
either the incomprehensibility or utility of torture may hold the key for a critique of the
recent segmented development of the human rights dimension of global governance.
This hegemonic analysis, despite its Western-centric tone, realistically recognises that
as currently interpreted globalisation advances consolidated state risk/security interests,
against a plethora of contesting ideologies, interests and rights perceptions beyond the
nation state. The sectarian and hegemonic differentiation of combative power constellations
which constitute current global hegemony exhibit this phenomenon in the prevailing war on
terror.19
As my earlier work has endeavoured to establish for transitional cultures,20 the process
of globalisation affects key actors and stakeholders differentially depending on their
inclusion or exclusion within and beyond the global community.21 Some actors dominate
while others are marginalised by the process of globalisation.22 Dominant actors currently
locate in the Western alliance of liberal democratic politics and capitalist market economics,
and they determine the new politics of global governance.23
Normatively at least, when signiﬁcant and universal rights issues such as personal integ-
rity are endangered through a phenomenon like torture, international humanitarian law is
assumed to safeguard the rights and privileges of all global citizens. Historically, torture
has been determined through the relative prisms of cruelty, horror, tyranny and shame,
even where exercised in the processes of ‘justice’ or harsh morality.24
Torture has always been bound up with military conquest, regal punishment, dictatorial terror,
forced confessions, and the repression of dissident belief. 25
Therefore, along with the rise in international human rights law following WWII the inter-
national ban on torture is not surprisingly deemed to be unconditional in the language of
international law.26 According to the United Nations Convention against Torture, and
other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Punishment (1984) (UNCAT), article 1:
Any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inﬂicted
on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him, or a third person, information or a con-
fession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on dis-
crimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inﬂicted by or at the instigation of or
with the consent or acquiescence of a public ofﬁcial or other person acting in an ofﬁcial
capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in, or incidental to,
lawful sanctions.
Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1976), gives the ban
on torture its ‘rights’ status in declaring that no one shall be subjected to torture. The strict
prohibition is demonstrated by the fact that the covenant allows exceptions, in times of a
public emergency which threatens the life of the nation, for articles in the covenant to be
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derogated.27 Despite this, the covenant expressly states that Article 7, the prevention of
torture, is not included in any such exception and torture remains prohibited even in
times of public emergency.28 It seems clear from any literal reading of these international
treaties that the international ban on torture is absolute; there are no caveats or clauses that
provide exemptions. Even with a categorical prohibition of torture, its use is still promoted
by a security/risk approach to world ordering. This paper argues that the local/global
duality of globalisation in aligning risk and security with the challenges of harm prevention
and the consequent securitisation of universal rights protection offers a perhaps incomplete
understanding of this paradox.
The ‘Janus-face’29 of globalisation accommodates the possibility in hegemonic govern-
ance terms for the non-derogable injunction against torture to be applied with dual meaning
in either local or global governance contexts. Contemporary global governance operationa-
lised as it now is within an under-developed form of ‘new politics’30 recognises torture as
being appropriately prevented through the instruments of international law and inter-
national human rights conventions, while at the same time entertaining hegemonic justiﬁ-
cations for torture’s necessity against the globalised risk/security back-drop. It is the local/
global duality in determining risk security and the tension between the domestic and the
global nation state which fuels this divergence by asserting essential nation state securitisa-
tion and seeking to extend this to the protection of the legitimate global community.
Shift the focus of globalisation onto its localising aspects and interests (such as nation-
alism, autonomy, cultural separatism, xenophobia) then torture is promoted through a secur-
ity/risk approach to world order31 as viewed from the standing of domestic interest, and
torture becomes a control option rather than a controlled state practice. Thereby, the
paradox of preventing torture and at the same time promoting it stems from the duality
of interests at work towards global ordering when risk/security considerations move
from the global to the local, and when domestic interests set security above rights.
It becomes more convincing to argue for the mutual prohibition of torture across states
as a universal measure of civilised global engagement, than it will in contexts where the
nation state (or regional alliance) under threat seeks to employ all control technologies at
their disposal within the ‘legal’ justiﬁcation of self-defence.32 Hence,
a further development on the local/global duality is to view crime as patterns of behaviour and
reaction at the global level, while more as matters of individual variation in the local context.33
Torture as a response to global terror is problematic if the global hegemony trades off inter-
national law for exceptional responses to exceptional threats, while at the local level nation
states import and export torture almost as a duty to protect citizen safety. While one ‘face’ of
globalisation34 promotes the single community and an international obligation to prohibit
torture as a universal right of the global citizen, its other ‘face’ concurrently demands the
security/risk approach towards the paramount protection of the national citizen, whereby
domestic actors seek to maintain their preferred and often secular place within the world
order. It is this tension and contradiction between the protections of global citizenship
and the priorities of national citizenship that essentially create the political paradox
between the promotion and prohibition of policies on torture. In addition, citizenship
national or global is not in actuality universal and as such the paradoxical approach to pre-
vention/promotion of torture for citizen interest is complicated as it is applied either locally
or globally across hegemonic determinations and divides.35
The choice for key actors and agencies from nation states, regions and internationally,
charged with maintaining world order, is whether to respect international law and work
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toward a single global community commitment against torture or whether they should ﬁrst
and foremost protect their individual risk/security interests. As mentioned before, with the
global community divided across hegemonic interests, and the autonomy of powerful nation
states in the ascendency when securitisation is the measure of citizenship, universal rights
protection, even so deeply embedded as the torture prohibition, remain vulnerable.
Ultimately it is the dominant political hegemony and its amalgam of autonomous interests
that dictates how international governance is enacted,36 be this through international law or
through the acts of individual key actors and agencies.
What then becomes interesting particularly for the domestic torture dilemma is the
nature of the justiﬁcations for the use of torture. Where hegemonic power is so apparent,
and as it was in the days of the inquisition, why is torture not simply asserted as of right
or might? The contemporary debate advocating limited torture in conﬁned circumstances
remains nuanced by international humanitarian law. One reason for this is, I suggest, the
fragile nature of legitimacy in global governance. Rule of law states cannot afford to
discard the cloak of legality even against the utilitarian exigencies of self-defence against
global terror. To do so would be a clear concession to the nature of the violent resistance
that the application of torture is said to deter. The question that is begged by this is to
what extent can a non-derogable human right be qualiﬁed within international humanitarian
law without deﬁling the tenuous legitimacy that such law affords? Even the search for leg-
alist exception challenges the literal interpretation of international law and politicizes state
legal agencies and their opinions through the justiﬁcation cause.
Globalisation has resulted in a further paradox wherein normative governance and
resultant policy considerations become more global, and at the same time key control
actors and agencies in the global arena adopt a more localised view of risk and security.
Foucault saw this domestic governance focus (despite his disinterest in international gov-
ernability) as a natural, even inevitable consequence of hierarchical governance with the
state and its capacity to securitise all facets of ‘governmentalisation’ at the apex. For Fou-
cault this necessitated the state as central for an ‘internationalised world’.37 Recent critics
such as Selby argue that this is a much too limited interpretation of contemporary forces for
globalisation. That said there can be no denying, through the torture debate at least, the pre-
eminence of autonomy when measuring global ordering from the situation of dominant
state security.
As I will suggest later, attempts at global ordering unduly inﬂuenced by nation state or
regional risk/security interests have resulted in a realistic appreciation of harm (such as
torture) being marginalised. Globalisation is the backdrop against which the issues of
global governance, individual actors and agency interests, and global ordering are set in
this governance trend for securitisation dominance over universal rights protections and
uniform harm evaluation.
The global war on terror as a political discourse rather than an empirical evaluation of
global harm, ultimately represents the securitisation paradigm working from a domestic
control response to terrorism (utilising the localised Janus-face of globalisation and defend-
ing domestic citizen safety through torture) in the ‘name of international liberal democratic
values’.38 At the global level, the dominant political alliance view of terrorism has enabled
the promotion of an exacerbated if unrealistic risk/security approach to globalisation39 and
global ordering which takes state security as a foundation, elaborating up to global commu-
nity which corresponds to selective state interest. It has also provided a justiﬁcation for the
use of violent, para-justice control agendas, such as torture, to combat threats to local and
global citizenship.40
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The ultimate result of globalisation is that as the world setting is compressed there is an
intensiﬁcation of consciousness towards global interests such as selective ordering running
parallel with strongly inﬂuential autonomous interests of the nation state and regional con-
cerns, and the consequent individualised inﬂuence of key actors and agencies.41 However,
as risk and security disproportionately motivate globalisation, dominant nation state inter-
ests (which are at the heart of what operationalises global hegemony) become the prevail-
ing measure of global ordering. Attitudes to ‘harm’ converge around these sectarian
interests from the local to the global. As such, the need to torture, as the argument
goes, to better ensure domestic security will, if consistent with hegemonic interest it is
logically and even ‘legally’ argued, bring about both domestic and global ordering as a
consequence.
Who’s interests in global ordering?
The promotion of this security/risk approach to world order has its foundations in the
terrorist attacks of 9/11. These attacks represented a signiﬁcant turning point in global gov-
ernance through securitisation; ‘the crunch point; the apocalypse now’.42 It turned inter-
national crime, in the form of terrorism, into an attack on national citizenship and on
civilization and Western values,43 thereby challenging the dominant political ordering of
world power and securitisation. Consequently interpretations by the dominant political alli-
ance regarding global terrorism changed from nation state or regional responses into a gal-
vanising battle cry determining a ‘conceptualisation and promotion of the new globalisation
(risk/security hegemony)’.44 This risk/security approach to world ordering has featured
global terrorism as justiﬁcation for the use of para-justice control regimes such as torture.45
The dominant global political alliance has reacted to the harm caused by terrorists by, in
effect, treating terrorists and terror suspects as outside international law and universal
human rights protection, and therefore they can be subjected to torture.46 As outlaws,
terrorists (and their communities) forfeit universal human rights protections, it is argued,
because they reject the international laws and governance regimes on which these rights
rely. One cannot impugn a Western rights framework through violence and expect to
receive its beneﬁts if securitisation envelops terrorists and their communities.
Even so, legal principles and processes of ‘justice’ are exeptionalised and challenged in
order to claim legality for the consequences of ‘outlawry’. Terrorists have been highlighted
by those dominant in the global hegemony as a potential threat to global ordering and secur-
ity, and as such are denied ‘traditional criminal justice protections and even international
human rights’.47 Along with the alienation of outlawry, a realistic appreciation of harm
has been marginalised in efforts at global ordering.
Globalisation ‘divides as much as it unites’.48 It should not be surprising that those who
are left behind49 in the globalising rush seek to retaliate as they see the dominant alliance
disproportionately prospering from globalisation whilst they suffer.50 This suffering is
made worse by the marginalisation of harm in efforts to achieve global ordering, because
those who are left behind remain on the periphery of global order while the dominant alli-
ance repositions global governance to exclusively favour legitimated global citizens and
valid victims. In effect this creates a global politics where the privileged are securitised
to govern and those deemed to be their enemies are withheld from the protections of
global community.51 Harm legitimately visited upon the enemy through securitisation is
re-interpreted in light of the protection it is said to afford those with the rights of inclusion
within the global community and its governance realm. As the realistic appreciation of harm
is marginalised by these sectarian and exclusionist approaches to global ordering it is easy
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to become ‘pessimistic about the prospects for global governance and the probabilities of
continuing disarray in world affairs’.52
The current security/risk phase of globalisation and the resultant approach to world
ordering summarised so far has had far reaching effects on the constituency and reach of
international human rights protections which have accompanied the development of the
modern phase of international criminal justice.53 Torture may be prohibited unequivocally
by international and human rights law, yet the supervening security/risk approach to world
order has seen its use argued as ‘legal’ in the shadow of 9/11. The hegemonic nature of
global governance, up until the recent ﬁnancial meltdown in 2009 at least, aligned with
military dominion, allows for this paradox to appear reconciled on the road to global order-
ing, but not from the perspective of resistant and excluded communities.54
For the majority of world states and populations excluded from this hegemony, and
wherein violent resistance to the dominion of hegemonic values is generated, the neutering
of jus cogens rights where they are most needed will have a profound effect on the inclusive
legitimacy of notions such as the global community. The dependency of developing nations
on the dominant political alliance has had a fundamental effect on the marginalisation of a
realistic appreciation of harm. This dominant alliance, as has been shown by the post 9/11
war on terror discourse, used global terrorism as reasoning to localise its priorities and
promote the use of para-justice control ideals such as torture.55 As a result the ‘delivery
and legitimacy of international criminal justice’56 has been compromised and with it a
realistic appreciation of harm marginalised.
How is ‘harm’ in the name of deterrence used to counter ‘harm’ in the name of
resistance?
The paradox between the international law prohibition of torture and its promotion by a secur-
ity/risk approach to world ordering is a political consequence of the relationship between glo-
balisation and world ordering, in governance terms.57 I have argued so far that a risk/security
focus for contemporary globalisation, where the governance imperatives directed towards
global ordering generate from the sectarian, securitisation interests of powerful nation
states in the global hegemony, is in no way inconsistent with the Janus-faced dynamic of glo-
balisation. The dominant Western alliance states pressure other actors within global ordering
to act in ways that complement the ideals of Western liberal democracy and political
economy,58 thereby legitimating their dominion over global governance and their role in
determining and policing world order. This force-centred rather than rights-endorsing legiti-
macy of the political alliance has both promoted and been facilitated by the implementation of
para-justice, in particular torture, to run contrary to the principles laid out in international
law.59 Para-justice exceptionalism, cloaked by arguments for its constitutional legality,
suggests that the hegemonic political alliance is incapable of ‘restoring world order
without violent responses’.60 This inability to govern without violence leads to the consider-
ation of the second paradox highlighted in the introduction, how harm in the name of deter-
rence is used to counter harm in the name of resistance.
The paradox of harm as a deterrent to counter harm in the name of resistance is not
novel in the critical literature on political economy and human security. The recent debate
about the philosophical and practical implications of this paradox has its roots well before
the shadow of 9/11 and can be divided into two dominant directions; deontological and
utilitarian. Originating philosophers of the deontological argument, such as Kant,61 argue
that there are no circumstances justifying the use of another human being as a means
rather than an end in terms of personal integrity. This invocation supports the absolute,
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international prohibition of torture. On the other hand utilitarians, such as Bentham,62
counter that the greatest good should be done for the greatest number, even at the
expense of individual integrity. In utilitarian terms, if torturing someone can save a sufﬁ-
cient number of lives to qualify as being for the greater good, it should be permitted.
These opposing arguments clearly ground either direction of the recent policy and aca-
demic debate (as later discussed) surrounding the use of torture as a deterrent to
counter harm used in resistance.
While acts of torture are prohibited by international law they are promoted by a loca-
lised security/risk approach to world ordering. The sectarian nature of global hegemony,
advancing as it does the interests of powerful Western states, makes the translation of dom-
estic securitisation to the motivation for global ordering a predictable progression. The
result of this trend is that ‘harm’ as deterrence (torture) is used to counter ‘harm’ in the
name of resistance (terrorism). The effects of this domestic interest originator of globalisa-
tion, and the resulting paradox on torture, means that a realistic appreciation of ‘harm’ is
marginalised so that attempts at global ordering may be successful.
‘Harm’ in the name of deterrence and ‘harm’ in the name of resistance can be generic-
ally aligned with torture and terror respectively. Those at the receiving end of globalisation,
while remaining largely excluded from its beneﬁts, will in certain conditions resist the
exclusionist world ordering paradigm as currently composed by hegemonic political and
economic interests. Coming from a position of weakness terror can be one of the few
modes of resistance open to the marginalised and disaffected. In its terrorist manifestation
harm in the name of resistance can be legitimated by resistant communities as a reaction to
the marginalising effects of globalisation.63 The activities of terror are carried out against
the particular interests of global elites. Terrorist attacks single out the speciﬁc interests of
the hegemonic decision-makers in the world order and in so doing are designed to
provoke actual and symbolic harm to those interests in the name of resistance. Terror so
directed evokes a reaction among the global elites who use the instrument of harm in the
name of deterrence, to counter the activities of terrorists. The instruments of harm in the
name of deterrence are in turn justiﬁed with a political parlance of pre-emptive/ responsive
attacks, self-defence or the responsibility to protect.64 As with the terrorists, the pre-emptive
or responsive attacks by the global elites are a reaction to harming their speciﬁc interests in
the world order, both practical and symbolic. In this way harm in the name of deterrence and
harm in the name of resistance focus on the particular interests of the individual actors that
are involved rather than on the achievement and protection of a universal and inclusive
world ordering. Both harm in the name of deterrence and harm in the name of resistance
grow out of a commitment to the localising face of globalisation and its sectarian interests.
The application of either harm motivation for exclusionist interests rather than inclusive
ordering leads to the escalation of hostilities creating in its wake the securitisation of fear
in the modern world.65 For instance, the use of torture to counter terror can be explained
as a result of the ‘relatively positive and purposive representation of globalisation and its
“legitimate” features, such as development, when contrasted against the pathological
representation of crime’.66 Waldron stresses that:
torture, like terrorism, instrumentalises the pain and terror of human beings; it involves the
deliberate, studied, and sustained imposition of pain to the point of agony on a person who
is utterly vulnerable, prostrate before his interrogator, and it aims to use that agony to
shatter and mutilate the subject’s will, twisting it against itself and using it for the purposes
of the torturer.67
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The liberal ideology of torture, which assumes that torture can be neatly conﬁned to
exceptional ticking-bomb cases, and almost surgically severed from cruelty and tyranny,
represents a hegemonic delusion as much as it does a questionable interpretation of
truth-seeking. The assumptions on which this allusion is based become more dangerous
still when coupled with the para-justice excesses promoted out of a war on terror global
governance discourse. The war on terror paradoxically is conceived as a permanent emer-
gency in which the global political elites insist that their emergency powers rise above the
limiting power of statutes and treaties while at the same time retaining some constitutional
legality through a responsibility to protect legitimate state citizenry and outlaw resistance.68
The global elites whose particular interests are harmed by the activities of marginalised
actors through acts of terror, react in ways to deter further threats to their interests; harm in
the name of deterrence, taking both pre-emptive and retaliatory form.69 The utilitarian jus-
tiﬁcation for torture, questionable as it may be, argues for the obtaining of information that
they hope to use to deter further acts of terror against their particular interests, and the re-
establishment of hegemonic world ordering which sustains and grounds sectarian interests.
Each causal step in this chain could be challenged from the perspective of credible inves-
tigation methods, as well as individual’s rights violations.
The investment in crime control (and the eradication of harm in the name of resistance
deﬁned as crime) essential as it now is to governance local and global70 has been recognised
at a global level by the war on terror discourse following the attacks of 9/11. The exagger-
ated levels of fear of terrorist crime locally and globally, and the need for securing social
space and ordering is politicised as ‘a generation-long pattern of political and social
change.71
A bridge too far? Justifying torture
Dershowitz, Walzer and Shue, along with numerous other academics, have all, at least par-
tially, been inﬂuenced by utilitarian views that torture should be permitted if it is to prevent
a greater evil.72 Shue uses the example of a nuclear bomb placed in the heart of Paris where
the only way to prevent the death of thousands of people and the destruction of numerous
priceless artifacts is through torture. He states; ‘I can see no way to deny the permissibility
of torture in a case just like this’.73 The arguments made by Dershowitz and Walzer follow
similar lines, that torture may be permissible should it be the only way of gaining life-saving
information from terrorist suspects.74 These justiﬁcations through the greatest good for the
greatest number, of the ‘ticking time-bomb’ scenario are policy manifestations of using
harm as a deterrent to counter harm in the name of resistance. As argued earlier from the
perspective of exclusive and elite political and economic interests it is a justiﬁcation advan-
cing the localised ‘face’ of globalisation, with actors protecting their own interests before
any inclusive legitimacy of the international community through universal access to
rights protection above the expedients of securitisation.
Counter to the argument that torture is in some instances permissible for the protection
of elite security interests to the detriment of more universalised and inclusive ordering, is
the deontological-based argument that states torture is never permissible because a
greater and common morality should be used as the principle to constrain the pursuit of
the ideal order.75 Consistent with the dominion of human integrity over human security,
Waldron argues that whilst we undoubtedly treat the guilty differently to the innocent
this does not mean ‘we may treat the guilty any way we like’.76
The academic debate surrounding the paradox of harm being used as a deterrence to
counter harm in the name of resistance is intriguing for the manner in which it has been
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colonised, and some might say perverted, for either side of a distinctly governance-oriented
strategy, local and global. In either form, the debate highlights reasons why torture should
be prohibited but also provides a convincing case for it being permitted. The policy choice
then becomes one between the normative value of security against integrity.
A contemporary case study of the torture paradox playing out politically is the recent
progress from denial to argued legality following revelations of the US’ role in the
torture of terrorist suspects. The most high-proﬁle and notorious alleged uses of ‘harm’
as a deterrent are levelled against the US following the catastrophic events of 9/11. The
US ratiﬁed the convention against torture in 199477 thus agreeing to the complete prohibi-
tion of torture. They also afﬁrmed that their position was that exceptional circumstances did
not justify the use of torture.78 However, following the attacks of 9/11 the Bush adminis-
tration launched its war on terror79 which, at its core, had the de facto policy and practice of
torture.80 After sensational press exposure of US military practice in Iraq and Afghanistan,
the US sought to loosen the stringent deﬁnition of torture81 in order to give their actions
integrity and maintain their own moral standing in international law. They pursued a
course of action that they argued was still within the scope of international law.
However, as CIA Director Cofer Black expressed it, there was a before 9/11 and there
was an after 9/11. After 9/11 the ‘gloves came off’ demonstrating that there was no
longer a complete prohibition on torture.82
The then US President Bush was unequivocal in his public stance against the use of
torture.83 However a number of Justice Department memoranda published subsequently
have shown that the actions of the US did not mirror this rhetoric. The Bybee Memoran-
dum, for example, was seen by some advocates of the torture prohibition and subsequent
governmental accountability as ‘a hair-raising memo that understandably caused wide-
spread alarm’.84 The memorandum offered a controversial and partisan opinion for the
legal basis of torture as a legitimate option in US military investigation practice for inter-
rogating terrorist suspects and establishing the acceptable institutional methods which
could be deployed in carrying out such interrogation, ongoing.85 It argued that in the US
implementation of the United Nations (UN) convention against torture the term ‘severe
pain’, in order to constitute torture, would have to be a sufﬁciently serious physical con-
dition or injury such as death, organ failure or serious impairment of body functions.86
The ramiﬁcations of such a policy meant numerous practices commonly recognised as tor-
turous were now excluded from the US’ deﬁnition and therefore permitted.87 It is clear from
the content of this memorandum that the US had maintained a practice of interrogation that
involved torturous acts against terrorist suspects at least since 9/11. Despite this the US
military and justice administrations sought to do so in a way that could be viewed as com-
pliant with international law. While the proposed deﬁnition of ‘severe pain’ clearly circum-
vents the spirit and ideals with which the convention provision is to be viewed it allowed the
US to claim justiﬁcation for their actions and arguably maintain their moral standing in the
global order. The US was endeavouring to conﬁrm the legal, political and even moral neces-
sity (in governance terms) to, through torture, promote harm as a deterrent to counter harm
as resistance.
An example of where the US carried out para-justice torture practices is Guantanamo
Bay, a detention camp situated on Cuban territory. Prisoners have given evidence that
they were held at Guantanamo and subjected to various acts that many would consider
torturous including;
long-term sleep deprivation, extremes of heat and cold, painful stress positions, beatings,
forced nakedness and other degrading treatment [and] indeﬁnite solitary conﬁnement.88
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If these actions occurred in order to extract intelligence from prisoners then international
case law from Northern Ireland and Israel demonstrates that the threshold for torture is
soon reached.89 The US Government itself proclaimed in a case involving one of the prison-
ers held at Guantanamo that the US could imprison him indeﬁnitely even if there were
claims that they were carrying out torturous acts.90 The procedures and principles used
at Guantanamo have been denounced by several non-governmental organisations91 and
even justice ofﬁcials in the UK, with Collins J. delivering the damming assessment that,
‘America’s idea of what is torture is not the same as ours.’92 Torture was not an isolated
or localised investigation technique in the armory of global ordering incentives. Guanta-
namo was only one in a ‘chain of shadowy detention camps that also included Abu
Ghraib in Iraq, the military prison at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan and other, secret
locations run by the US intelligence agencies’.93
Abu Ghraib represented a major political embarrassment for the US Government when
pictures were released showing ‘US soldiers giving the “thumbs up” behind a stack of
naked Iraqi men or a battered corpse [and] of military dogs snarling at a naked, helpless
prisoner’.94 The US and its allies were forced to publically admit that while some such prac-
tices were unacceptable, overall and in the face of exceptional abuses of their own human
rights expectations, the advancement of ‘harm’ as a deterrent remained one of the policies
of global hegemonic interests in countering ‘harm’ as resistance.
The dominant political alliance prioritises security with regards to global governance95
thus creating the conditions for the use of torture to be tolerated. The initial question to con-
sider when establishing whether a realistic appreciation of harm has been marginalised as an
unavoidable consequence of this ‘harm’ deterrence-against-resistance counterpoint is what
essentially constitutes a realistic appreciation of harm? A narrow and anachronistic way in
which this can be considered is through the earlier stated academic debate on the use of
‘harm’ as a deterrent. The alternative positions in the debate both have strong foundations
for their arguments, however when analysed conjunctively they provide little insight into
what universally might represent a realistic appreciation of harm. This could be a result
of the distinctly different frames of reference within which they are constructed and enun-
ciated, one resonant of rights and principle, the other policy and pragmatism, one accepting
the need to adapt to political extremities, the other eschewing any compromise, emergency
or not.
Waldron takes the constitutional legality approach to integrity which uniformly con-
structs a realistic appreciation of harm. For him personal and individual perception and
reaction does inﬂuence the objective measure of harm, in the form of torture, but essentially
and irrevocably governed by:
what the law requires. . .they are not treaties of personal ethics but conventions establishing
minimum legal standards for the exercise of state power.96
It is, therefore, from the perspective of the protections offered by, and obligations created
through international treaties and conventions, that the realistic appreciation of harm
should be considered. So too, in my writing on globalised crime it is reiterated that inter-
national justice (not military force or para-justice exceptionalism) must strengthen its pos-
ition in crime control; therefore enforcing a realistic appreciation of harm fundamentally
measured against justice and humanity.97 As hegemonic interests retain, it is not only the
US that has promoted this unrealistic appreciation of harm according to Amnesty Inter-
national (AI). AI reported that numerous governments, even those widely view as
‘civilised’, are using torture in various forms.98 Once again this contradicts the realistic
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appreciation of harm dictated by international and human rights laws, or concerns for
justice as the foundation for crime control.
Globalisation and global ordering: quest or compromise
Globalisation is not as straightforward as the creation of a single, harmonious, global arena
for universal peace and good order,99 especially when it comes to crime and crime control.
Globalisation has the ability not only to ‘re-integrate and unify but also to marginalise and
divide’.100 The potential for forces of globalisation to unify is demonstrated through the for-
mation of international organisations such as the UN which, at least with the normative if
not practical coalescence of global hegemony, endeavour to guarantee international peace
and security.101 However, as the torture case study reveals, even the strongest normative
constructions of global communitarian morality are hostage to the sectarian ordering of
elite interests for the beneﬁt of their legitimated citizens and victims. This distinction under-
mines the simple but crucial global governance underpinning, that if the policies of inter-
national organisations such as the UN were even generally followed then there would be
a common and more accountable appreciation of harm within the global community, uni-
versal and inclusive, to be protected by supervening and consistent rights frameworks.
Harm would be deﬁned in a manner that applies to all actors within the global arena and
would not be deﬁned by sectarian and hegemonic efforts of global ordering.
Against the actuality of contemporary global governance, such an egalitarian ‘world
order is a chimera’.102 ‘Globalisation is a process of paradoxes’103 and as such this
article argues a signiﬁcant and explanatory discriminator of global ordering and global
harm is that globalisation both ‘internationalises and localizes’.104 The subtlety of this
duality is revealed through the world’s reliance on the UN for guaranteeing peace and secur-
ity only with the assistance and concurrence of the world’s major powers; that concurrence
being limited as it is to where hegemonic interests and UN peace propositions align through
the protection of domestic interests and the re-assurance of exclusive and unique hegemonic
global ordering priorities. To add to this governance irony is the diligence with which hege-
monic military force has sought the legitimacy of UN Security Council mandates to rubber
stamp selective war-making. Thus the problematic relationship between hegemonic power
and global democracy in the development of global governance has not only secularised
world ordering but:
the governance imperatives of a dominant world order have tended to compromise the delivery
and legitimacy of international criminal justice.105
The paradox between the international and local ordering priorities within globalisation has
ultimately led to policy drift between the prevention of torture through international law and
its promotion through a risk/security approach to world order. The rise of securitisation
interest in global terrorism, particularly around the events of 9/11,106 has resulted in a loca-
lised control focus, especially within the US, then broadcast as a compatible global ordering
imperative. As the superpowers enforce the risk/security model into global ordering, global
institutions are forced to ‘perpetuate the globalised hegemony of the dominant western alli-
ance’.107 This compulsion to politicise international criminal justice108 in particular, so as to
help achieve a sectarian ordering, results in the realistic appreciation of harm being margin-
alised as global institutions and ‘smaller’ nations are the recipients of harm inﬂicted by the
superpowers and their agents to protect their localised interests. I draw on these ideas in
describing the dominant hegemony’s approach to international policy and global ordering;
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If internationalism is seen as complementing that notion of Westernised world order then it too
is embraced by the current hegemony. In such a setting hegemony tolerates and works with
other political forces within global institutions which may peacefully oppose Western
values. If hegemonic order is contested then the return to the alliance-based security is
apparent.109
In the process of linking the world together through a web of global regulatory networks,
these linkages operate more in favour of some actors, especially the self-appointed
decision-makers (global elite), and at the same time marginalise those at the receiving
end of globalisation. Bauman describes this setting:
rather than homogenising the human condition, the technological annulment of temporal/
spatial distances tends to polarize it. It emancipates certain humans from territorial constraints
and renders certain community generating meanings extra- territorial – while denuding the ter-
ritory, to which other people go on being conﬁned, of its meaning and its identity-endowing
capacity. For some people it augurs an unprecedented freedom from physical obstacles and
unheard-of ability to move and act from a distance. For others it portends the impossibility
of appropriating and domesticating the locality from which they have little chance of cutting
themselves free in order to move elsewhere. With ‘distances no longer meaning anything’,
localities, separated by distances also lose their meanings. This however augurs freedom of
meaning-creation for some but portends ascription to meaninglessness for others.110
While the global elite sets the agenda for world ordering in a way that maximises and fosters
their particular interests, the marginalised actors are consigned to a continuum from exclu-
sion beyond the beneﬁts of global community, to outlawry. A realistic appreciation of harm
also risks marginalisation as hegemonic global ordering is achieved, at least in terms of a
sacriﬁced discourse of rights protection and the constraint of its outreach to the citizens
and victims of a hegemonic global community.
Under these conditions, a realistic appreciation of harm cannot be achieved because of
the contextually dependent aspiration and interpretation of global ordering, and the lopsided
power/rights differential ensuring its achievement and maintenance. A realistic appreci-
ation of harm in the world can be achieved under the present conditions of exclusive hege-
monised global world ordering that rely on selective and exclusive securitisation.
From a global governance perspective the risk/security paradigm itself is risky. With risk pre-
diction and security evaluation, more reliant on political and cultural context than comprehen-
sive and comparative harm measures, community safety gives way to community imperative as
a primary governance obligation. It might be said that this is not unusual for governance frame-
works which run to service political agendas. However, the difference for global governance is
its declared commitment to the safety of humanity. That safety may be less likely to be achieved
and even more likely to be endangered when terrorism and violent control responses exemplify
the risk/security commitment for global governance. Further, with globalization promoting
preferred regulatory strategies to address risk/security concerns, governance against terror
will become more polarized and essentially less tolerant of cultural diversity as it is deemed
threatening.111
The harmful effects of the process of globalisation on those at the margins of global order-
ing receive only self-serving treatment at the hand of the global elite. Rarely will hegemonic
interest be qualiﬁed or compromised in the achievement of order unless in doing so greater
interests are ensured. Crime control (local and global) provides an example of how sectarian
interests percolate from national to global governance in the endeavour of socio-political
ordering. Crime control as a primary state inﬂuence over community safety and
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securitisation at the domestic level is currently shaped by risk reduction techniques that
compromise rights protection, as the torture case reveals. Criminal justice priorities from
a state perspective have fallen into line with neo-liberal retributive justice paradigms
wherein the autonomy and responsibility of the citizen is conﬁrmed (as offender and
victim) and state or private justice intervention is designed to prevent and contain the
harm which crime presents.112
Conclusion
At the global level, harm as resistance in the form of terror has created what hegemonic
interests deem to be a new risk/security paradigm inviting a similar control response as
that which protects domestic interests and order. Resistant communities are marginalised
and terrorist suspects outlawed. Rights become the victim in the name of global
ordering:
The globalization of crime represents the potential to view many crime relationships unbur-
dened of conventional legal and moral determination. Globalisation working towards a
common culture is intolerant of difference by arguing for a preferred politic (democracy), a pre-
ferred economy (modernisation) and a preferred value structure (materialism) by emphasizing
the integrity of the legitimacy of new domains of legitimate such as the global community. Ter-
rorism in such discourse is determined by global governance as an attack on global citizenship,
and efforts at its control have recently justiﬁed extraordinary military and law enforcement
interventions on behalf of this amorphous community.113
The current closing phase of globalisation has as its centre of attention a risk and security
approach which subscribes and defers to global ordering at the cost of universal human
rights protection, for those arguably most in need of it because of their marginalisation
in or exclusion from hegemonic global community.
I argue globalisation has created a number of paradoxes where global ordering and gov-
ernance are dictated by the dominant political hegemony, and rights become secularised,
not universal. Those who seek to contest the views of the hegemony, such as terrorists,
are placed outside the global order and international protection and thus are subjected to
the one-sided appreciation of harm that has been constructed by the hegemony114 in
attempts at global ordering. As a consequence,
the values of freedom, equality, communitarian harmony and personal integrity which the pro-
secution of crimes against humanity are said to advance need not be sacriﬁced in a ‘new world
order’ obsessed with partial security and secularised risk.115
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